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Stephen Gillerst
Despite its unexplained plural title, Death Penalties' reiterates Raoul
Berger's single theme, delivered now from the terrain of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments."' Berger
maintains that the framers' discoverable intent fixes the legal meaning of
constitutional terms and that courts act unconstitutionally if they impose
different meanings.' More than half of Death Penalties reargues this posi-
tion and responds to its critics. Only two of the book's seven chapters
dwell on the Eighth Amendment or the death penalty. One comes away
from Death Penalties wondering whether its purpose might in fact be to
reargue principles of constitutional interpretation rather than to assess the
Supreme Court's death penalty decisions, the history of capital punish-
ment, or the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. A
reader attracted by the book's name will find in it little new on these
matters. This is not a criticism of Berger's reasoning or scholarship, but a
caution that the book contains little scholarship on the death penalty itself.
It would better have been called Berger Redux.
One explanation for the discrepancy between the book's title and con-
tent may be that Berger's constitutional stand on capital sentencing is so
t Professor of Law, New York University. I gratefully acknowledge the comments of Professors
William E. Nelson and David Rudenstine and of David A. Kaplan, Esq., on an earlier draft of this
Review.
1. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual panishments inflicted.").
3. Pp. 71, 78-79, 158; see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
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far anterior to the locus of the present debate that he is unable to join this
debate wholeheartedly. Berger believes, based on his reading of the fram-
ers' intent, that the main concern of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
prohibit discrimination against blacks with respect to certain rights;4 the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not impose on the states
any of the provisions of the Bill of Rights;5 the Constitution does not for-
bid states to punish without "judicial trial" unless Congress requires such
trials;6 it is not obvious that racial discrimination in jury sentencing (in-
cluding death sentencing) amounts to a denial of equal protection;7 and
the cruel and unusual punishments clause forbids only punishments
deemed "barbarous" by its framers,' who did not require proportionality
between crime and punishment,9 and that therefore death,10 ear crop-
ping,"' flogging,'2 branding,"8 mutilation,' and disembowelment1 are
constitutional even for minor offenses. With these views, Berger is not
likely to find it useful, perhaps not even possible, to pursue such narrow
current questions as whether death sentences may stand though based in
part on invalid and nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, 6 or whether
a sentencing jury may properly be told that a life sentence includes the
possibility of parole." So perhaps it should come as no surprise that much
of Death Penalties contains little of relevance to the current death penalty
debate.
At least three difficulties confront one who, claiming that "intent equals
meaning," argues that death for the theft of a loaf of bread18 or that muti-





8. Pp. 44, 174.
9. Pp. 114-15, 148, 175.
10. Pp. 34 & n.28, 114-15, 174.
11. P. 118 & n.29.
12. P. 113 n.6.
13. Pp. 113, 118 n.29.
14. Id.
15. P. 41.
16. See Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (plurality opinion) (state judge's reliance, in
sentencing defendant to death, on aggravating factor that is not proper aggravating circumstance
under state law does not violate federal constitution); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) (up-
holding death penalty where 1 of 3 aggravating circumstances was set aside as unconstitutional).
17. See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983) (requirement that sentencing judge inform
jury in capital case of governor's power to commute alternative sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole to prison term with possibility of parole not unconstitutional). For a general
discussion of constitutional procedural issues in capital cases, see Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
18. P. 128.
19. Pp. 41, 113, 118 n.29. Since the Eighth Amendment, in Berger's view, does not require that
the punishment be proportional to the offense, see infra pp. 733-40, any punishment the framers did
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must first demonstrate that those responsible for the adoption of the lan-
guage of the cruel and unusual punishments clause intended that these
punishments survive the adoption of that clause. He must next convince
us that the adopters intended that the meaning of the clause continue un-
altered despite unforeseeable social changes or new learning.2" Finally, we
might reasonably expect him to recognize that an equation of intent with
meaning is not self-evident, but rather presupposes a theory of meaning
that itself requires defense.21
I.
In his effort to identify the intent of the framers, Berger reviews En-
glish and American constitutional history and then applies the lessons he
draws to the Supreme Court's capital punishment cases.
A. The English History
Virtually all of Berger's discussion of the English antecedents to the
cruel and unusual punishments clause centers on Anthony Granucci's ar-
ticle tracing the origins of the clause.2 Granucci argued that the 1689
English Bill of Rights-part of which anticipates the Eighth Amend-
ment 2 -was intended to prohibit excessive punishments.24 Relying almost
not intend to foreclose by the cruel and unusual punishments clause would be constitutionally
permissible.
20. For a discussion of these burdens, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 213-17 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
469, 482-97 (1981). By "adopters," I mean those whose assent was necessary for the enactment of the
Constitution or of an amendment, as opposed to the authors or framers of the Constitution or the
amendment. Brest, supra, at 214-15; Dworkin, supra, at 482-83.
21. Proponents of various theories of constitutional interpretation disagree among themselves over
the extent to which intent determines meaning and over other appropriate sources of meaning. For a
discussion of the approaches of "seven representative scholars," see Brest, The Fundamental Rights
Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1063, 1067 (1981).
22. Pp. 30-43; see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Infiicted': The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
23. Compare Granucci, supra note 22, at 855 (citing 1689 Bill of Rights) ("That excessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.")
with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
24. Granucci, supra note 22, at 844-47. A proportionality requirement was recognized in Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Proportionality is a well-established requirement in capital
cases. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376-77 (1982) (death penalty excessive for felony
murder when defendant did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that life be taken or that lethal
force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("sentence of death is grossly dispropor-
tionate and excessive punishment for rape"). Its force in noncapital cases, however, is less clear. Com-
pare Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009 (1983) ("There is no basis for the State's assertion that
the general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences. The constitutional
language suggests no exception for imprisonment.") (footnote omitted) with Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) ("For crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of
imprisonment is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.").
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solely on the same sources as Granucci,25 Berger concludes that the En-
glish Bill of Rights prohibited a penalty only if, in 1689, it was both cruel
and unusual (for example, "crucifixion" or "boiling in oil") and that ex-
cessiveness was irrelevant.2" Thus, Berger and Granucci differ on whether
the eighteenth-century meaning of cruel and unusual punishments in-
cluded a proportionality requirement.27
A brief examination of the sources used by Granucci shows why Ber-
ger's scholarship is sloppy and misleading. First, Granucci's interpretation
of the 1689 Bill of Rights relies on chapter twenty of the Magna Carta,
which provides that
a free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accor-
dance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he
shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a
merchant likewise, saving his merchandise, in the same way a villein
shall be amerced saving his wainage; if they fall into our mercy. And
none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the
testimony of reputable men of the neighborhood.28
This language and the cases Granucci cites construing it29 recognize that
there was a proportionality principle for "amercements." Since in Gra-
nucci's view an amercement is the equivalent of a modern day fine, and
therefore penal in nature, he concludes that the Magna Carta introduced
a proportionality principle into the penal law.30 By contrast, Berger states
that "amercements were compensation for injuries, not penal fines levied
by a court. . . . [They were] not, therefore, 'the equivalent of the modern
fine' ... 
Berger's conclusion rests primarily on one secondary source,32 William
McKechnie's Magna Carta.3 McKechnie's view on the status of amerce-
ments, however, is at odds with Berger's; nevertheless, Berger neither
points out this difference nor explains what evidence leads him to disagree
25. See pp. 29-43; Granucci, supra note 22, at 844-47.
26. Pp. 41-42.
27. In Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983), the Supreme Court concluded that "Itihe principle
that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence." Id. at 3006.
28. Granucci, supra note 22, at 846.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 845-46.
31. Pp. 30-31.
32. Pp. 30 n.6, 31 nn.7-9, 12, 13.
33. W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (1905). There is also a second, revised edition. See W.
MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1914). Granucci cites to the second edition. Granucci, supra
note 22, at 845 n.27. Berger cites to the first edition. P. 30 n.6. Although the second edition contains
an abbreviated discussion of chapter 20, there is no substantive difference between the two editions.
Subsequent references to McKechnie will be to the first edition except where quoted language is
different in or absent from the second edition.
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with McKechnie.
In Magna Carta, McKechnie describes "[t]he efforts made in medieval
England to devise machinery for suppressing crime. . . ."' The first was
the "bloodfeud," followed by "money in lieu of vengeance," and then
"amercements." 5 The second gave way to the third because the money
payments "demanded from a wrong-doer" by the victim's family, various
lords, the church, and the king became too high. The Crown stepped in
and allowed the wrongdoer to set his property "unreservedly at the king's
disposal" and receive "not only a free pardon, but also the restoration of
the balance of his effects, after the king had helped himself to a share."36
That share became an amercement:
Strictly speaking, the man's life and limbs and all that he had were
at the king's mercy. The Crown, however, found that it might defeat
its own interests by excessive greed; and generally contented itself
with exacting moderate sums. . . . The amounts taken in each case
were regulated partly by the wealth of the offender, and partly by
the gravity of the offence. Further, it became a recognized rule that
the amount should be assessed by what was practically a jury of the
culprit's neighbors; and attempts were also made to fix a
maximum.37
McKechnie distinguishes amercements from medieval fines:
In the thirteenth century these terms were sharply contrasted.
"Amercement" was applied to such sums only as were imposed in
punishment of misdeeds, the law-breaker amending his fault in this
way. He had no option of refusing, and no voice in fixing the
amount assessed upon him. "Fine," on the contrary, was used for
voluntary offerings made to the king with the object of procuring
some concession in return-to obtain some favour or to escape some
punishment previously decreed. Here the initiative rested with the
individual, who suggested the amount to be paid, and was, indeed,
under no legal obligation to make an offer at all. 8
McKechnie viewed amercements as a "punishment" for wrongdoing,
not, as Berger argues, as "compensation for injuries." The "penal" char-
acter of amercements seems compelling given that they went to the king,
34. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 334 (1905).
35. Id. at 334-35.
36. Id. at 336. This language does not appear in the second edition.
37. Id. at 336-37 (footnote omitted). The second edition has the same language with a few
changes, most notably the substitution of the words "with moderate forfeits" for the first edition's
phrase "with exacting moderate sums." W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 286 (2d. ed. 1914).
38. W. McKECHNIE, supra note 34, at 344. The second edition contains the same thought in
slightly modified language. W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 292-93 (2d. ed. 1914).
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not the victim; that there were efforts to establish a maximum; and that
their size varied with the offender's wealth and the nature of the offense,
not with the victim's loss."9 In fact, Berger appears to confuse an amerce-
ment with its predecessor, "money in lieu of vengeance."
A second historical source on which Granucci relies is the 1613 case of
Hodges v. Humkin.Y' Hodges had been imprisoned for making "very un-
seemly speeches" about the Mayor of Liskerret; he sought release on
habeas corpus. According to Granucci, the King's Bench found that
"[i]mprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the of-
fense, and so is the Statute of Magna Charta cap. [20] and of Marlbridge,
cap. 1 secundum magnitudiem, et qualitatem delicti the punishment ought
to be, and correspondent to the same, the which is not here in this
Case ... .""' This language recognizes a proportionality principle for the
penal sanction of imprisonment. Further, its reference to the Magna
Carta supports Granucci's interpretation of chapter twenty. Berger resists
Granucci's conclusion: "This was not a holding by King's Bench but a
quotation from one of three opinions, that of Justice Croke. Justices
Haughton and Dodderidge did not invoke Chapter 20, possibly because it
prohibited excessive amercements, not imprisonment."42 Berger appears to
be wrong. He omits to tell us that Justice Dodderidge, who opined prior
to Justice Croke, is quoted again, immediately following Justice Croke's
opinion: "Dodderidge Justice agreed herein: and if a constable do arrest
one and put him in the stocks. . . he ought not to keep him there by the
space of a week; no more might the major keep him here in prison so long
as he hath done." '43 Dodderidge's "agreed herein" suggests a concurrence
in Croke's opinion, making it the majority view. Berger may want to ar-
gue against this construction, despite what Dodderidge adds, but as a
scholar, he has the duty to present the evidence.
Furthermore, Justice Haughton, the third member of the bench, said
that Humkin "ought not to imprison [Hodges] for ever," '44 and Justice
Dodderidge, as quoted above, thought the maximum imprisonment "the
space of a week." Faced with this language and with Croke's opinion and
its reference to the Magna Carta, Berger is willing to concede only that
39. Holt also considers amercements payments imposed for an "offence" or a "crime" and traces
the "principle that amercements should fit the crime [to] the Charter of Henry I." J. HOLT, MAGNA
CARTA 230 (1965); see also 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 490
(1883) (chapter 20 of Magna Carta and 1689 Bill of Rights govern "amounts of the fines and the
length of the imprisonment which the court may impose").
40. 80 Eng. Rep. 1015 (K.B. 1613).
41. Granucci, supra note 22, at 847 (quoting Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1613), with minor differences in spelling and punctuation).
42. P. 33.
43. 80 Eng. Rep. at 1016 (Dodderidge, J.).
44. Id. (Haughton, J.).
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"at most Hodges v. Humkin stands for the proposition that a mayor is not
authorized to imprison one for disrespectful words spoken out of court for
an overlong term imposed months after the speech."14 5 In other words,
Berger says the case may recognize a proportionality limitation, but one
that binds only an officer of the King and only when the sentence is for a
particular crime imposed "months after" the crime is committed. Berger
makes no effort to support this strikingly narrow interpretation.
Granucci also cites the case of Titus Oates, who was tried and convicted
of perjury before the King's Bench in 1685.46 Oates was sentenced to life
imprisonment, a fine, whipping, pillorying, and defrocking.47 In 1688, he
petitioned both houses of Parliament for "a release from the judgment,
calling it 'inhumane and unparalleled.' "48 Parliament had issued a Dec-
laration of Rights on February 12, 1689; its text was enacted, with some
changes, as the Bill of Rights on December 16, 1689."9 On May 31, 1689,
a majority of the House of Lords rejected Oates' petition without opin-
ion.50 Fourteen Lords dissented and gave the following reason, among
others:
Because [the majority's decision] is contrary to the declaration on the
twelfth of February last, which was ordered by the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal and Commons then assembled, and by their declara-
tion engrossed in parchment, and enrolled among the records of par-
liament, and recorded in chancery; whereby it doth appear, that ex-
cessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.5"
45. P. 34.
46. Granucci, supra note 22, at 856-60. Granucci's other sources predate the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights by centuries, and he cites them for the historical light they shed on that docu-
ment's cruel and unusual punishments clause. The Oates trial, however, differs from the other sources
in that it occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the English Bill of Rights.
47. Id. at 858.
48. Id.
49. P. 36; Granucci, supra note 22, at 855. Both Granucci and Berger fail to distinguish between
the Declaration of Rights and the Bill of Rights. After James II threw the Great Seal into the
Thames on December 11, 1688, there was no legal government in England. James' Parliament had
been dissolved in July, 1688. William of Orange, who landed in England on November 5 and
marched unopposed to London, caused the calling of a Convention Parliament, which resolved that
James II had abdicated and that the throne was "thereby vacant." On February 12, 1689, Parliament
agreed to the Declaration of Rights. The throne was offered to William and Mary subject to their
acceptance of the Declaration of Rights. Eventually, Parliament "turned its Declaration into a regular
act of the legislature enacted as a statute in 1689. Hence, the name Bill of Rights itself is the result of
the fact that the original Declaration was introduced as a bill . . . in the new Parliament." I B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 41 (1971); see R. PERRY, SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 222-23 (1959).
50. In re Titus Oates, 10 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1227, 1325 (T. Howell ed.
1816).
51. Id.
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Granucci cites the Oates case to show contemporary understanding of the
term "cruel and unusual punishments." 2 Since none of the punishments
imposed on Oates were considered cruel or unusual "methods" of punish-
ment at the time, Granucci argues, the dissent's reference to the recent
Declaration of Rights makes sense only if that document is read to require
proportionality. s
Berger contests Granucci's reference by citing other reasons advanced in
the dissent. But the fact that there were other reasons-for example, that
a temporal court lacked power to defrock Oates"-does not negate that
the dissent also relied on the Declaration of Rights. Berger does not ad-
dress this reliance. He says only that "the Lords in effect decided that
whipping, pillorying and excessive imprisonment were not within the
clause."1 5 This is inaccurate. The majority did not decide that "excessive
imprisonment" is not within the clause. The majority said nothing. By
using the word "excessive," Berger assumes the question and then uses
the majority's unexplained affirmance to answer it in his way. We do not
know the majority's reasons. It may have viewed the Declaration of
Rights as prohibiting excessive imprisonment but not have considered
Oates' punishment excessive. Berger's conclusion as to what the Lords
decided is guesswork.
Finally, on the Oates case, Berger writes: "Granucci concluded that 'In
the context of the Oates case, "cruel and unusual" seems to have meant a
mere punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction
of the court to impose.' ",56 This is not what Granucci concluded. He did
not say "a mere punishment." He said "a severe punishment. ' 57 This
error drains Granucci's conclusion of his reason for citing the Oates case
in the first place.58
Another source Granucci relies on is a fourteenth-century document, a
purported copy of the Laws of Edward the Confessor, which, he argues,
extended the proportionality requirement of amercements to cover physi-





57. Granucci, supra note 22, at 859.
58. The fact that the Oates opinion on which Granucci relied was a dissent is not decisive. Four-
teen Lords believed that they had the power to vacate a sentence on the ground that it was "contrary
to the declaration on the twelfth of February last [1689] ... whereby it doth appear, that... cruel
for] unusual punishments [ought not be] inflicted." See supra p. 737. Granucci argues that the dis-
senters concluded that Oates' sentence violated the Declaration of Rights because of its length. Of
course, if the majority based its conclusion on the absence of power to assess the length of a sentence,
Berger's argument would be supported. But the majority might have concluded that the Declaration of
Rights prohibited excessive punishments and that Oates' sentence was not excessive. Berger chooses to
draw the former inference; since the majority issued no opinion, however, there is no basis for Ber-
ger's conclusion.
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cal punishments: "We do forbid that a person shall be condemned to
death for a trifling offense. But for the correction of the multitude, ex-
treme punishment shall be inflicted according to the nature and extent of
the offense." 59 Berger, citing Barrington, completely dismisses the docu-
ment as a forgery, 0 but Berger then chooses not to cite or quote Barring-
ton's further conclusion that:
The fact that the chronicle is spurious, must be accepted, however
regretfully. But even with that fact before us, it would not be advisa-
ble to totally cast aside the whole of the chronicle as useless and
valueless, for there is much in it that is true and a help to the study
of the trying times of which it speaks. It was written near to the time
which it purports to describe, and the facts therein contained.may in
some measure have been in the possession of the writer; at least it
might have been so in the case of these laws, for as to them, there
could have been little gain in forging."'
Berger argues that "the crowded catalog of statutes decreeing death for
trivial offenses explodes the so-called common law 'doctrine' that punish-
ment must fit the crime."62 Although it may seem extreme-and inappro-
priate-to our sensibility, the existence of execution for particular offenses
is not necessarily inconsistent with the proportionality doctrine. Berger's
argument does exactly what he condemns the Court itself for do-
ing-"reading our sentiments back into the minds of the framers."6" Be-
cause today we consider execution disproportionate for the offenses now
deemed "trivial," Berger infers that the same offenses were always consid-
ered trivial.
Moreover, the mere existence of the death penalty, even for "trivial"
offenses, is not itself inconsistent with a proportionality principle. We
need to know when and against whom the penalty was actually used.
Here, there was place for discussion of royal pardons, jury nullification,
prosecutorial discretion, and benefit of clergy. English law relied on each
to avoid harsh punishments. Berger writes only: "To be sure, any one
who could read was insulated from [the death penalty] by 'benefit of
clergy'; and in time death sentences were commuted to transportation to
and imprisonment in the colonies. But commutation of a statutory sen-
tence does not nullify the statute."'" True enough, but surely it is the
59. Granucci, supra note 22, at 846.
60. P. 32.
61. B. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 181-82
(2d ed. 1900).
62. P. 35.
63. P. 57; see pp. 103, 107.
64. Pp. 34-35; see, e.g., 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 39, at 457-72 (availability of the benefit of
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pattern of use and not the mere presence of a statutory punishment that is
the best evidence of a society's toleration of extreme penalties. If today we
wished to identify society's view of the gravity of particular crimes, we
would not rely solely on the maximum permissible prison term for each
crime, but would also examine sentencing, prosecutorial discretion, and
parole records to identify actual punishments.
As Berger wrote in response to earlier criticism, "One who undertakes
to tear down the scholarship of another is under a duty of unimpeachable
accuracy."65 But his criticism of Granucci's scholarship is far from accu-
rate. Similarly, his contention that the terms of our supreme law are for
all time defined in the dictionary of history requires that he construct that
dictionary with the utmost care. There is no care evident in his treatment
of English precedent. He has conducted virtually no historical survey of
English sources beyond those cited in Granucci's article. Even if Berger
had successfully distinguished Granucci's sources, he would not thereby
have established his own position, but simply that Granucci's proposition
remained unproven.
B. The American History
Berger moves on to discuss the American adoption of the "cruel and
unusual punishments" language. He spends eight pages demonstrating
two propositions that are not seriously disputed. The first is that the
framers of the Eighth Amendment and their contemporaries did not re-
gard the death penalty as cruel and unusual.6" The best evidence for this
conclusion, of course, is the Constitution's own reference to execution 7
and the fact that the same Congress that adopted the Eighth Amendment
authorized execution for several crimes.6 8 Berger's second, uncontested
proposition is that even if the Fourteenth Amendment "absorbed" the
Eighth Amendment, its adoption was not intended to invalidate capital
punishment. 9 Largely unexplored, however, are the more important
questions of the framers' views on proportionality and whether these were
clergy to escape capital sentence); N. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D.
1307, at 68-108 (1969) (use of royal pardon in homicide cases).
65. Berger, Paul Dimond Fails to "Meet Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds," 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 285, 286 (1982). This is not the first time Berger has used the name of a critic in the title of his
response. See, e.g., Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REV. 427 (1981); Berger, Paul
Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981); Berger, The Scope of Judicial
Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 341.
66. Pp. 43-50; see Granucci, supra note 22, at 839-44.
67. P. 46; U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
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different from those held by English courts." °
In the final few pages of his chapter on the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause, Berger addresses the prospect that "activist counsel are
likely further to press the view that [execution] violates 'equal protec-
tion' " because it discriminates against "racial defendants. 11  He asserts
that racial discrimination in jury sentencing might not amount to a denial
of equal protection:
The common law prized the discretion of the jury and shielded its
verdicts from judicial inquiry. As an "attribute" of "trial by jury,"
these perquisites have constitutional stature. It should take more
than the "indeterminate," "vague and ambiguous" words "equal
protection" to persuade that the framers meant thereby to abandon
-so important and valued an attribute.72
Berger argues that even after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it was assumed that the states would be free to exclude blacks from jury
service. 3 Given the rejection of this "best possible safeguard against dis-
crimination," Berger concludes that
it is difficult to assume that the framers provided for even more far-
reaching intervention in the States' sentencing processes, particularly
when in many States the Negro presence was negligible. Then too,
the notion that the States would be required to abolish the death
penalty if their juries did not evenhandedly sentence blacks runs
counter to the framers' narrowly ameliorative aims. They sought to
ensure access to the Courts, to a fair trial, so that an innocent black
would not be railroaded to death. But to assume that they also meant
to save an undoubtedly guilty black murderer from the death penalty
because a jury had sentenced a white to life imprisonment is to ig-
nore the racism that ran deep in the North in 1866. 74
In sum, because the right to trial by jury (with an implicitly shielded
70. In addressing this issue in Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983), the Supreme Court stated:
"When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights,
they also adopted the English principle of proportionality." Id. at 3007.
71. P. 55.
72. Pp. 55-56 (footnotes omitted).
73. P. 56 (footnotes omitted).
74. Pp. 56-57. Berger also comments on a recent empirical study in which Hans Zeisel concluded
that death sentencing in Florida is racially discriminatory. Pp. 53-54; see Zeisel, Race Bias in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981); see also
Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a
Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 82 (1982) (concluding that prosecutors in the Florida
district studied "systematically (and effectively) exercised their peremptory challenges to exclude
death-scrupled jurors from capital juries [with] . . .devastating consequences for the adjudication of
capital cases").
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discretion) is in the Constitution, while another allegedly inconsistent
right (against racially biased jury death sentencing) must be inferred from
the words "equal protection," Berger concludes that the second right does
not exist. The concrete prevails over the general. In addition, the absence
of the "best possible safeguard" (blacks sitting on juries) negatives the
presence of a supposedly lesser safeguard. In Berger's view, the Four-
teenth Amendment has little effect on the scope of permissible punish-
ments or on racially motivated sentences.
The problem with these arguments, from Berger's own perspective, is
that they are only arguments. The right to trial by a jury with shielded
discretion is not necessarily inconsistent with a prohibition against dis-
criminatory capital sentencing, and it is possible to reject the purportedly
"best possible safeguard" and still mean to outlaw racial bias in capital
sentencing. It does not matter which interpretation is correct, however,
because for Berger the ambiguity should itself be troublesome. Berger re-
lies on the proposition that constitutional terms are "fixed" and that his-
tory will convey their meaning."5 But history proves incomplete in Death
Penalties; Berger must add a traditional lawyer's inference to the histori-
cal evidence he adduces. If he is free to do that, he has enlarged the route
for finding meaning. He should then allow others to travel the same route
and to draw different inferences.
C. "The Cases"
Berger describes his chapter called "The Cases" as a "compressed sum-
mary of the clashing views expressed in the several decisions [that] barely
scratches the surface of the voluminous plurality, concurring, and dissent-
ing opinions in each case ... ."' Berger is correct. The chapter is little
more than a compilation. Much of its discussion consists of juxtaposed
quotations from majority or plurality opinions, from dissents, and from
commentators critical of the Court's death penalty decisions or of the
Court generally.
As one might expect, Berger rejects the holding in Weems v. United
States,77 which recognizes a proportionality principle in the Eighth
Amendment; the plurality view in Trop v. Dulles'8 that the Eighth
Amendment must draw its meaning from society's "evolving standards of
decency"; and all of the Supreme Court's restrictive capital punishment
opinions. In this chapter, too, Berger misconstrues the record. In one criti-
cal paragraph, Berger writes:
75. See, e.g., pp. 71, 78-79.
76. P. 152.
77. 217 U.S. 349 (1910); pp. 113-15.
78. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); see pp. 116-22.
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Although the Gregg plurality-Justices Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens-quote [sic] Chief Justice Burger's statement that legislatures,
not courts, must respond to the will and moral values of the people,
and recognize that the "specification of punishment" is "peculiarly"
a question "of legislative policy," they conclude that "the Eighth
Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be
acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask
whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the
core of the amendment." Whence does it draw this "basic concept"?
From "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society," that is, "cruel and unusual punishments" may
"acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu-
mane justice." Thus, the desires of "contemporary society" must
yield to a "basic concept" that is drawn from "public opinion"-a
pretty example of circular reasoning.79
The circle Berger charges the plurality with creating is really his own.
He has misread the case. Berger correctly quotes the Gregg plurality as
requiring that a punishment comport "with the basic concept of human
dignity." °80 But the plurality did not define the "basic concept of human
dignity" in terms of "public opinion." Although it stated that "an assess-
ment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged
sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment," it then
immediately added:
But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of
decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A pen-
alty also must accord with the "dignity of man," which is the "basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." This means at least
that the punishment not be "excessive." When a form of punishment
in the abstract (in this case, whether capital punishment may ever be
imposed as a sanction for murder) rather than in the particular (the
propriety of death as a penalty to be applied to a specific defendant
for a specific crime) is under consideration, the inquiry into "exces-
siveness" has two aspects. First, the punishment must not involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second the punishment
must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.8"
The "basic concept of human dignity" is explicitly said not to be con-
trolled by "public perceptions of standards of decency." If the Court were
to find that a punishment involved "the unnecessary and wanton infliction
79. Pp. 126-27 (footnotes omitted); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
80. Id. at 182.
81. Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
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of pain" or was "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime,"
the punishment would fail, even though it met society's "evolving stan-
dards of decency." 82 Berger ignores this holding. He creates the circle for
which he criticizes the Court.
II.
Berger maintains that the framers intended to prohibit only "barba-
rous" punishments, and, in their minds, death penalties were not "barba-
rous."83 The Court has not held the death penalty itself unconstitutional,
but it has invalidated capital punishment for rape of an adult woman,84
for some felony-murders, 85 and for kidnapping,86 and it has concluded
that because "death is different" from every other penalty, the Eighth
Amendment mandates due process protections in capital cases that are not
required in any other criminal case. 7 We can agree with Berger that the
framers had none of this in mind when they proposed the Eighth Amend-
ment and that members of Congress and of the various state legislatures
likewise had none of this in mind when they ratified it. We can make
similiar assumptions about the Fourteenth Amendment.
This does not make Berger's case, however. Even if we concede that
intent equals meaning, the question Berger does not adequately answer in
Death Penalties is this: Assuming everyone who participated in the adop-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments viewed the death penalty
and extant procedures for deciding who would suffer it as not "cruel and
unusual," did they also intend to freeze the constitutional meaning of the
phrase for succeeding generations regardless of changes or new learning?
Berger says they did. He argues that while constitutional principles can be
applied to new facts, the principles themselves should remain fixed:
Weems v. United States, the bible of death penalty abolitionists, ar-
gued that "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be of wider
application than the mischief that gave it birth." This confuses ap-
plication of a principle to new facts with the Court's replacement of
a constitutional principle by its own. Of course the Fourth Amend-
82. The plurality reiterates this distinction later in the opinion. Id. at 182-83. Subsequent cases
have reworked Gregg's classifications, but have continued to stress the Court's constitutional obliga-
tion to make a determination informed by, but independent of, popular opinion. Enmund v. Florida,
102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376-77 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
83. P. 44.
84. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977).
85. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376-79 (1982).
86. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977).
87. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58 (1977)).
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ment "search and seizure" principle, for example, goes beyond phys-
ical searches to comprehend current wiretaps and electronic surveil-
lance. They are analogous to what was prohibited and illustrate the
application of a principle to similar facts. Very different is the aboli-
tionist reading of the cruel and unusual punishments clause-that
clause did not prohibit death penalties either in England or the colo-
nies. Nor was a ban on disproportionate penalties a part of the com-
mon law. Consequently, Weems was not giving a "wider applica-
tion" to an accepted principle but replacing the principle with its
own opposite.88
Berger thus draws a sharp distinction between the application of a princi-
ple to new facts and the creation of a new principle. That he can create
these neat categories in language, however, does not mean that he can as
crisply impose them on historical events.
For example, how does Berger know that the Fourth Amendment's
"search and seizure" principle goes beyond physical searches to include
current wiretaps and electronic surveillance? A contrary argument can be
made that the framers of the Fourth Amendment were offended by physi-
cal trespass and the seizure of real objects, and that if they had foreseen
the advent of nontrespassory electronic "seizures" of conversations, they
would have allowed these without constitutional controls." For a long
time, indeed, the Court rested its decisions on such a "physical invasion"
distinction,90 a distinction that was finally rejected in Katz v. United
States. 1 Since, under Berger's theory, the meaning of constitutional lan-
guage never changes, Katz can only be justified by arguing that the pre-
Katz opinions failed to see that the Court was merely being asked to ap-
ply an established principle to "similar facts," not to create a new princi-
ple based on later predilections. The pre-Katz courts must have been
wrong because, and only because, they did not recognize the nature of the
request. How is a court to know which task it is being asked to perform?
In endorsing Katz, Berger necessarily chooses between (at least) two
levels of abstraction for the Fourth Amendment. At the lower, more con-
crete level, the provision was intended to limit trespassory searches (of
"persons," "houses") for real objects ("papers," "effects"), searches and
seizures the framers surely contemplated. To apply the Fourth Amend-
ment to nontrespassory electronic surveillance of conversations, Berger
must recognize in it a "principle" that protects against the "violat[ion of]
88. Pp. 72-73 (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
89. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-74 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928).
91. 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
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privacy upon which [a person has] justifiably relied." ' Berger is willing
to recognize this principle, though to do so requires that "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" be abstracted to include wires, radio signals and con-
versations. But Berger cannot then deny that he is glazing the constitu-
tional language with his "twentieth century predilections." 93 Since we
have no way of knowing if the eighteenth-century framers would have
agreed with Berger, the choice, even if dressed up in references about
their intent, must ultimately be his. The fact that in 1928, in Olmstead v.
United States," the Supreme Court saw a different principle in the
Fourth Amendment is some evidence that the framers might have dis-
agreed with Berger. After all, the predilections of the Olmstead Court
come from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, closer than
Berger's to the time of the framers.
Or perhaps Berger is not pretending to know what the framers would
have done had they foreseen modern technology and instead is acting on
his own to abstract a principle from the Fourth Amendment after first
satisfying himself that at least the framers did not specifically intend to
exclude his result. If so, Berger must be basing his interpretation of the
language of the Fourth Amendment on his own twentieth-century predi-
lections about privacy. But more than that, to be true to himself Berger
must also be saying that the framers intended the Supreme Court to have
this freedom, or at least that they did not intend to deny it.
This freedom, furthermore, cannot logically be limited to technological
discoveries. Would not social science learning also have to qualify as a
development the Court could permissibly weigh in ascertaining the impli-
cations of a principle fairly abstracted from the constitutional language?
For example, advances in the psychology of perception have engendered
rules governing the use of eyewitness identification in criminal cases.95
More generally, it would seem that the justifying development need not be
a science, social science, or other kind of discovery at all. New patterns of
demographic or economic activity, such as those that influence the scope of
the commerce power9 6 or the breadth of a state's extraterritorial assertion
of personal jurisdiction,"' would also suffice.
If Katz is a valid exercise of Supreme Court power because the framers
intended to allow future generations freedom to apply consistent but un-
92. Id. at 353.
93. P. 117.
94. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
95. Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
96. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113-211 (10th ed.
1980).
97. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS
59-133 (3d ed. 1980).
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contemplated Fourth Amendment "principles" to "new facts," then there
might be a basis for distinguishing death penalty cases from electronic
surveillance cases. For (to come back to Berger's often-repeated argument)
the framers and adopters of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did
not intend these provisions to apply to capital punishment. Consequently,
the argument continues, the Supreme Court may not frustrate the power
of the federal or state governments to execute (or, indeed, to brand, muti-
late, disembowel, or flog) for any criminal act. Furthermore, this conclu-
sion remains valid even if developmenis extinguish the conditions that
gave rise to the particular framer intent and even if the constitutional
language fairly yields a principle which, when applied to the new condi-
tions, counsels a result inconsistent with framer intent. In short, regardless
of discoveries or changed circumstances, the Court in this view may not
notice facts arising after the date of a provision's adoption if to do so
defeats original intent. Consequently, the Court may not take notice of
studies showing the psychological effect of racially segregated schools on
minority children sa or of changing patterns in the use of (or failure to use)
capital punishment. 99
This seems quite a strange distinction to attribute to the framers, but
one that Berger must accept if he is going to endorse Katz v. United States
and condemn Brown v. Board of Education °10 and Furman v. Georgia.1"1
Yet if any distinction were intended, it would intuitively seem to be the
opposite one. By prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishments"-words
Madison thought "too vague to have been of any consequence, since they
admit of no clear and precise signification" 102-the framers passed up the
opportunity to definitively exclude death penalties. With regard to unfore-
seeable issues, such as authority to conduct nontrespassory electronic
seizures of conversations, however, there was no such opportunity. A
knowing refusal to include limiting language can be construed as author-
ity to ignore limits within the author's power to impose, whereas no simi-
lar inference is fair with regard to matters that are largely unforeseeable.
98. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954) (relying on psychological
evidence to conclude that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
99. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring) ("[P]ast and pre-
sent legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light
of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury...
may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime.").
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 243-45.
101. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
102. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 49, at 453.
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III.
Berger is free to search the historical record and uncover the intent of
those who were instrumental in drafting and adopting the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Such discoveries here are of value not only to
those who believe that intent and meaning are equivalent, but also to
those who believe that intent bears on meaning. Berger ceases to be an
historian, however, and becomes instead a political, legal, or moral philos-
opher when he contends that the meaning of constitutional language is the
intent of the framers. A theory of constitutional meaning necessarily pre-
supposes a philosophical position. Meaning is a construction we place on
events, not a fact that can be discovered through historical detection. 03
Berger seems not to recognize this. He certainly does not acknowledge it.
He seems equally unaware that his unarticulated theory of meaning is not
inescapable and that competing and respectable theories of constitutional
meaning yield conclusions rather unlike his.
We may gain some perspective about contemporary attitudes toward
constitutional meaning if instead of looking back on the centuries about
which Berger writes, we treat our own age as history and consider how
Berger's view of constitutional meaning fares when applied to events of
the last third of the twentieth century. In the past decade, the nation
nearly adopted a new amendment, which said in part: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex." 10 Yet the words "equality of rights under
the law" sound very much like the phrases Berger tells us the Court has
so abused in the past. Did those who voted for the amendment believe that
the Supreme Court would be forever bound by the meaning each voter
intended, as revealed in legislative and public debate? If not, how is it that
so many people were willing, and are still willing, once again to give the
Court final authority to construe a phrase like "equality of rights under
the law," knowing (as members of Congress and state legislators surely
do) of the Court's interpretive history? If an amendment with this kind of
language is someday adopted, would Berger presume to be able to tell us
its meaning for all time? Would we expect or want to know?
It may be that the great mission of Raoul Berger is not so much to save
us from the Supreme Court as to free us from ourselves.
103. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 496-97. For discussion of Berger's failure to recognize this
principle in Death Penalties, see Richards, Book Review, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1372 (1983).
104. H.R.J. Res: 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs. By
Peter Schuck. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. x,
255. $25.00.
Cass R. Sunsteint
The last few years have seen a resurgence of academic interest in what
might be called structural questions-those of procedure and remedy.
While the 1960's and early 1970's produced an outpouring of writing on
substantive problems, most prominently free speech and equal protection,
more recent writers have shifted the focus. The interest in structural ques-
tions is evident in essays on hearings for those deprived of government
benefits," on separation of powers,2 on equitable relief,$ and on judicial
remedies for misconduct by administrative agencies. 4
One might attribute this renewed interest in remedial problems to the
notion that substantive problems present questions of politics or taste, on
which little remains to be said. But at a deeper level, I think, the empha-
sis on structural questions reflects an interest in three problems that turn
out to be substantive after all.
The first is the problem of promoting the participation of those affected
by administrative and judicial decisions. In particular, the structural in-
junction appears to furnish a mechanism by which a variety of affected
persons may participate, or at least be represented,5 when basic social
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Douglas G. Baird,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Richard A. Epstein, Richard A. Posner, Richard B. Stewart, Geoffrey R.
Stone, and James Boyd White for helpful comments on a previous draft.
1. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85; Mashaw, Adminis-
trative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981); Michelman,
Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in 18 NOMOS 126 (1977); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property': Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 445 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE LJ. 451 (1979);
Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking-
Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
3. See, e.g., 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNMION (1978); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980).
4. See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in
Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981).
5. See Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE
L.J. 1474, 1478-80 (1982).
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choices are made. In this respect, the structural injunction may operate as
a kind of surrogate for the legislative process.6
The second is the strain put on conventional doctrines by efforts to pro-
tect the wide range of statutory benefits provided by modern government.
Traditional judicial remedies allow for the protection of common law lib-
erty and property-rights against governmental intrusion into the realm
of private autonomy.7 By contrast, structural remedies are designed to
protect the new rights created by the administrative state: rights to welfare
benefits, to freedom from discrimination, to government employment.
Purely negative decrees-the sort of remedy commonly associated with the
courts-inadequately implement those positive guarantees. Considerable
creativity seems necessary to devise and perfect judicial tools to enforce
regulatory programs.
The third factor relates to recent attacks on the notion that adjudication
generates outcomes that are in some sense objective and distinct from the
power struggle of politics.8 In the face of those attacks, there has been a
renewed effort to see whether structure or process may discipline social
decisions.9 Process has, in this sense, been treated once again both as an
important legitimating device and as an end in itself.
Peter Schuck's Suing Government"0 is an ambitious effort to set forth a
general theory of judicial remedies for official wrongs. Schuck attempts to
discuss together two remedies typically treated separately in the literature:
liability for damages and injunctive relief. There is much that is valuable
and illuminating in the analysis, and the book is, I think, an important
contribution to the current debate. At the same time, it is incomplete, for
it fails to treat adequately the three sources of the renewed interest in
remedial problems. Before elaborating these criticisms, however, it is use-
ful to explore Schuck's argument in some detail.
I.
There are three parts to that argument. The first sets forth a conceptual
framework for analyzing remedial questions, the second proposes an over-
6. See Fiss, The Supreme Court-1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (1979).
7. See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 14-20 (1978); Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669-70 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983).
9. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 17-1 to 17-3 (1978); Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
10. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983) [herein-
after cited by page number only].
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haul of the current system of damage remedies, and the third deals with
the problem of injunctive relief.
A.
The conceptual framework arises out of Schuck's analysis of the differ-
ent reasons for governmental illegality, the various remedial tools availa-
ble to the courts for remedying such illegality, and the purposes judicial
remedies might serve. Schuck begins by observing that a government offi-
cial may violate the law for a number of reasons.11 Officials may not
know what the law requires. They may be unable, because of a lack of
resources, to comply with the law. They may have improper motivations.
Or they may be merely careless. The reasons for official illegality may in
turn have an important bearing on the usefulness of a particular remedy.
The courts have at their disposal a number of tools to remedy official
illegality: declaratory judgment; damages; and various forms of injunctive
relief, including the structural injunction. These tools vary substantially in
terms of their intrusiveness and the demands they place on courts. A de-
claratory judgment, for example, requires only a conclusion of law; it does
not by its own force require any change in the defendant's conduct. A
structural injunction, by contrast, enables the court to seize control of an-
other institution and to monitor its functions through continuing
supervision.
These remedies, Schuck suggests, might promote one or more of the
goals of the public law. Following the conventional catalogue, Schuck lists
six such goals: deterrence, promotion of vigorous decisionmaking, compen-
sation of victims, exemplification of moral norms, achievement of institu-
tional competence and legitimacy, and systemic efficiency through the inte-
gration of the primary goals.12
B.
This conceptual framework serves as background for the second part of
the book, an attack on the reliance of the current remedial system on dam-
age remedies against government officials. According to Schuck, that sys-
tem not only fails to promote any of the six remedial goals but also creates
perverse incentives for government officials.
In general, public officials, unlike their counterparts in the private sec-
tor, do not retain any of the benefits that flow from their decisions."3 Al-
though the status and income of government employees may be improved
by successfully taking chances, "the returns for accepting risk are far more
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risk-taking. 1 4 The predominant remedial tool of damages makes officials
personally liable for violations of the law; indemnification from the gov-
ernmental employer is "neither certain nor universal.""5 As a result, when
the prospect of damage liability is added to the official's calculus, decision-
making is skewed toward risk aversion. Action has significant personal
costs without corresponding personal benefits; inaction may have few ben-
efits-personal or social-but little cost as well. The possibility of per-
sonal liability for unlawful action tends to generate inaction, delay, or an
unproductive formalism that produces little but documents to defend offi-
cials in lawsuits.
Schuck thus suggests that the official decisionmaker, trapped by the fear
of personal liability, is inclined to avoid courses of action that might turn
out to be beneficial. At the same time, Schuck rejects one obvious rem-
edy-to reestablish the balance by allowing damages for unlawful inaction
as well-on the ground that it would have unpredictable effects on official
recruitment, vigorous decisionmaking, and civil service morale.16
Because of the skewing effect of damages liability, Schuck argues, the
courts have developed immunity doctrines to shield officials and thereby
promote more vigorous decisionmaking. Such doctrines, however, have
disadvantages of their own, for they undermine deterrence and defeat
compensation. In addition, the need to ascertain "good faith," a conven-
tional basis for immunity, produces enormous administrative costs. The
current system emerges as a kind of crazy-quilt: damages remedies that
skew incentives in an undesirable fashion and immunity doctrines that, in
a crude effort to counteract those incentives, undermine the goals of public
tort law.
Schuck's proposed remedy is simple-transfer liability from individual
officials to the government as a whole.1 7 Such a system, he contends,
would avoid nearly all the hazards associated with official liability. First,
it would strengthen deterrence. Except in the atypical cases of intentional
wrongdoing, placing liability on the official may not deter at all. The
agency, by contrast, is "well equipped to deter," since at the agency level
a number of crucial ingredients converge: a comprehension of the
full range of social values affected by the misconduct and by efforts
to control it; an understanding of the technology of how particular
14. P. 68.
15. P. 85.
16. Pp. 77-79; cf. National Black Police Ass'n v. Velde, 631 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(federal officials not absolutely immune from monetary liabilities for failure to act), vacated and re-
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misconduct can be deterred; the incentive to optimize not only deter-
rence but also competing values, notably vigorous decisionmaking;
and the resources to ensure that this knowledge and incentive is used
at street level.18
At the same time, government liability would, in Schuck's view, promote
compensation, since he would make the government liable for every tor-
tious act or omission committed by its agents within the scope of their
employment."' The other purposes of the public tort law would also be
promoted. There would be no adverse effect on vigorous decisionmaking,
and moral norms exemplified in statutory and constitutional provisions
would be realized more readily.2
0
C.
The third part of the book discusses the problem of injunctive relief.
Schuck believes that the problem is worth addressing because government
liability will sometimes fail to vindicate the various goals of public tort
law.21 First, when social valuations of the costs and benefits of legality
diverge from the government's valuations, monetary damages that allow
the government to choose between legality and compensated illegality will
inadequately deter government officials. Furthermore, some of the costs of
official illegality-such as those resulting from unlawful school segrega-
tion-are not easily monetizable. And in some cases-especially those in-
volving judicial or prosecutorial behavior-it may be worthwhile to pre-
serve governmental immunity while fashioning an injunctive remedy to
guard against unlawful conduct. Finally, damages relief may not provide
an effective "signal" to the bureaucracy; its effects may be felt too slowly,
and low-level bureaucrats may ultimately not comply.
When any of these factors is present, the cornerstone of Schuck's sys-
tem-governmental liability-may be insufficient to deter illegal official
conduct. Schuck suggests that some form of injunctive relief may be ap-
propriate in such circumstances. 2 He acknowledges that such relief has
considerable costs and that it taxes the institutional capacity of judges by
forcing them to assume managerial and supervisory roles for which they
are ill-suited. But he argues that a structural decree can sometimes be
"legitimated" through a particular conception of its function.
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"pure rights" conception, 8 focuses on the courts' role in identifying indi-
vidual rights and downplays or ignores implementation problems. Schuck
rejects this conception because it is unrealistic and naive. The second con-
ception, which Schuck attributes to Owen Fiss, is called "judicial interpre-
tivism."2 ' That approach recognizes that structural remedies are not logi-
cal deductions from substantive rights, but nonetheless treats the courts as
the best institutions for identifying public values to guide the remedial
enterprise. According to Schuck, this understanding is "juridocentric" be-
cause it disregards the process by which values are "actualized . . . and
absorbed into the life and practice of the society." 25'
Schuck prefers an "institutional competition" conception that recognizes
the important role of nonjudicial institutions in the remedial process. 26
Under this approach, "conflicting goals, limited resources, political and
ideological struggle, and human and institutional imperfections transform
partial meanings into social reality. '27 The distinguishing feature of this
conception is its emphasis on the fact that governmental actors other than
the courts play a substantial role in implementing constitutional or statu-
tory rights, especially when implementation involves managerial or alloca-
tional decisions whose consequences are not easily grasped by the courts.
Schuck believes that this conclusion does not deprecate the rule of law, but
instead removes an unwarranted emphasis on the judiciary.
Schuck concludes by sketching "a remedial system for the future."2"
Such a system would expand governmental liability for damages as the
basic element of public tort law, thereby displacing the current patchwork
of official liability and immunity. Injunctive relief would be available only
in those rare cases in which damage liability would not do the job. In such
cases, courts should be sensitive to their own limitations and their depen-
dence on other branches of government. When injunctive relief is re-
quired, courts should always fashion the least restrictive remedy. The
most intrusive remedies would be available only as a last resort and upon
a showing of recalcitrance. In sum, courts should adopt a graduated re-
sponse to social problems demanding injunctive relief. Schuck concludes
with a suggestion that other branches of government ought to assume a







29. Pp. 197-98. In the same vein, Professor Mashaw has recently suggested that a focus on judi-
cial remedies may deflect attention from the more important mechanisms for transforming administra-
tive performance. See J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 6 (1983). For recent efforts to exercise
executive and legislative control, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (guidelines
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II.
Two characteristics of Suing Government are especially impressive.
The first is the effort to distinguish considerations usually mixed together
in discussions of remedial problems. Schuck neatly sorts out the purposes
of remedial doctrines, identifies the various reasons for judicial inability to
afford effective structural relief, catalogues the reasons for government il-
legality, and analyzes the several factors that may make damage remedies
inadequate.
The second impressive feature of the book is its examination of the
weaknesses of the current system of personal liability and of the advan-
tages of governmental liability. The point is not new,30 but it is made
exceptionally well. Schuck argues that the current scheme, with its patch-
work of official liability and immunity rules, could be substantially im-
proved, at least in some contexts, by a system of governmental liability.
The basic proposal has much to recommend it.
A.
The book, however, is incomplete. The effort to set forth a conceptual
framework is, I think, only partly successful. Schuck provides a useful
catalogue of relevant factors: the reasons for official illegality, the various
remedial tools, and the purposes of the public tort law. Like most such
catalogues, however, his list is of limited usefulness. One needs a method
for relating the three to one another and a way to develop some hierarchy
of reasons, tools, and purposes. What does one do wheh compensation
conflicts with deterrence? How does one know what the role of "exempli-
fication of moral goals" should be? When does negligence rather than lack
of resources account for official illegality? What difference does it make if
one knows? Precisely when should a damage remedy be found inade-
quate? On such questions, Schuck provides little help.
There are, moreover, weaknesses in Schuck's argument for a system of
governmental liability. Take, for example, the discussion of the subversive
effects of official liability. Schuck contends that liability inclines officials
toward delay, inaction, and needless formality. That claim, however plau-
sible, is highly speculative. We do not really know whether and to what
to increase agency accountability for regulatory actions); S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) (Regulatory Reform Act to facilitate judicial and congressional
review of regulatory actions).
30. See, e.g., Epstein, Private-Law Models for Official Immunity, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
53, 55-59 (1978) (official immunity); Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officials: Property
Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 26-33 (1978) (suggesting reorder-
ing of civil liability rules applicable to government officials); Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 53-71 (proposing that tort remedies replace exclusionary rule as deter-
rent for unlawful searches).
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extent the specter of liability interferes with the judgment of lower-level
officials in state and federal hierarchies. In view of the enormous
costs-psychological and monetary-of instituting litigation, the assump-
tion that the interference is substantial requires a considerable leap of
faith. Indeed, the assumption is to some degree undermined by Schuck's
own claim that the current system provides significant disincentives for
victims seeking redress. If the existing system in fact discourages lawsuits,
one might think that official liability is necessary to achieve optimal
deterrence. 1
Moreover, I am not entirely persuaded by Schuck's effort to distinguish
between public and private employees in terms of the incentive for risk-
taking. The distinction has been made before,32 and undoubtedly there is
something to it. But surely there are low-level employees in private indus-
try who do not capture the benefits of aggressive action, and surely there
are bureaucrats in government whose willingness to assume risks is re-
warded. Moreover, in a bureaucratized and heavily unionized private sec-
tor, it is hard to believe that good or bad performance is automatically
reflected in the salary of the individual employee. The difference between
the public and private sectors is one of degree rather than of kind.
Schuck's use of economic analysis fails, moreover, to recognize or an-
swer a standard economic argument. If officials risk personal liability, and
if that risk skews incentives or discourages federal employment, presuma-
bly the government will increase salaries to provide ex ante compensation
for the risk. I do not mean to suggest that it does not matter whether
liability is placed on the government or on the official. But Schuck's fail-
ure to deal squarely with the economic argument is unfortunate.
Finally, Schuck does not adequately take account of the taxing power
and the resulting danger that a system of governmental liability will have
little deterrent effect" on official misconduct. Because it has the power to
tax, the government is fundamentally different from the private enter-
prises on which Schuck bases his proposal. To be sure, private industry
can pass on to consumers the costs of tort liability; the market, however,
furnishes at least some check on price increases. The government faces
much weaker constraints. It can hardly be said that the taxpayers' lobby is
sufficiently powerful to resist the likely minimal increases that might be
required by governmental tort liability of the sort Schuck proposes.
Schuck does recognize the related problem of locating liability at some
point between the treasury as a whole and the particular work detail
31. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
32. See Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1164 (1981)
(governmental enterprises less likely than private institutions to respond appropriately when their
employees are subject to overdeterrent liability constraint).
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whose unlawful conduct is at issue. Moreover, it should be possible to
structure a liability scheme so that the fear that damages might cut into an
agency's budget would affect the extent of illegal conduct. But in view of
the taxing power, there are severe practical difficulties in promoting the
goal of deterrence with a system of governmental liability.
B.
All of these are relatively minor objections to what is, on the whole, a
lucid and persuasive presentation. My more fundamental concern is with
that part of the book that deals with the problem of injunctive relief, a
problem that has received considerable attention in recent years."3 As I
have suggested, this interest stems from the potential of the injunction to
promote participation in the remedial process, to ensure direct and imme-
diate enforcement of the positive guarantees of the regulatory state, and to
help legitimate social choices.
Schuck's principal purpose is to undermine the "pure rights" and "ju-
dicial interpretivist" approaches on the ground that they are insufficiently
sensitive to the role institutions other than the courts play in translating
rights into remedies. To some extent, Schuck is attacking a straw man. I
doubt that anyone denies the courts' ultimate dependence on other institu-
tions of government. Moreover, Schuck's own "institutional competition"
model is itself indeterminate. It is of course true that courts depend on
other institutions and that regulatory provisions and the Constitution per-
mit or require some flexibility in the implementation process. In the end,
however, recognition of those points does little other than to suggest the
familiar point that institutional reform litigation often entails a bifurca-
tion of right and remedy.
To be sure, courts should be sensitive to the sometimes loose relation-
ship between right and remedy and to the need for deference to imple-
mentation strategies designed by the executive. Although it suggests a
"mood, '1 4 however, such sensitivity does not solve the fundamental
problems. In a hard case, should structural relief be granted? How does a
court promote compliance? How does a court inform itself of the conse-
quences of alternative remedies for persons not before the court? 5 What
should a court do when the defendant is unable or unwilling to comply?
33. See, e.g., Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791
(1976); Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978); sources cited supra note 3.
34. In the sense used by the Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)
(legislative history of the Labor Relations Act expresses Congressional mood with regard to standards
for judicial review of Labor Board decisions).
35. See D. HOROW1TZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-67, 255-98 (1977); Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 391-92 (1978).
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In my view, the increasing availability of structural remedies signals a
more dramatic development than Schuck acknowledges. The development
is, in brief, a shift from private to public law. Schuck tries to derive public
law from private law; the latter is seen as the paradigm, and the effort is
to build public law upon the best of private law. That posture has a
lengthy and honorable tradition in American administrative and constitu-
tional law. 6 Most of our public law-both substantive and procedu-
ral-grows quite directly out of private law and corresponding efforts to
treat the government as a defendant in a private lawsuit. But that model
is breaking down.8' And it is the breakdown of that model that accounts
for the special appeal of structural remedies.
American administrative law was originally founded on a notion that
governmental intrusions into common law liberty and property interests
were presumptively illegitimate; rights to a hearing and judicial review
were available to test the question of authorization of what would other-
wise be a common law wrong."8 That simple notion explains much of
administrative law until the last quarter century. But in that period, com-
mon law interests have been supplemented, sometimes supplanted, by a
wide range of opportunities-the right to welfare benefits, to government
employment, even to redress of harms inflicted by third parties, like dis-
crimination and pollution. Such opportunities are frequently given out by
agencies and officials who enjoy broad discretion. Many observ-
ers-including courts and agencies themselves-have thought it critical to
promote participation by regulatory beneficiaries as that discretion is exer-
cised. The challenge of a genuinely public tort law is to accommodate
these interests-the protection of new rights and the promotion of partici-
pation-in a regulatory era.
Schuck's discussion is largely insensitive to this challenge. Hence the
preference for monetary damages, the inconclusive catalogue of the goals
of public tort law, the useful but indeterminate discussion of competing
conceptions of the role of the court in structural reform litigation. I want
here to sketch the elements of a truly public, public tort law39 and to
suggest some of the implications for lawsuits against the government.
The first step is to abandon the idea that private tort law, with its
emphasis on protection of private autonomy, is a useful model on which to
36. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1717-18.
37. See J. VINING, supra note 7, at 22-27 (discussing breakdown in context of standing to review
administrative action); see also Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. (forthcoming) (discussing breakdown in administrative law generally).
38. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1202-
03 (1982).
39. C. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L.
REV. 849 (1980) (arguing against anticompetitive regulation).
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base public tort law. Many of the actions of which we are speaking can-
not be properly understood as efforts to promote private autonomy. At-
tempts to reform mental institutions, to eliminate the effects of racial dis-
crimination, or to require administrative agencies to enforce regulatory
statutes resemble conventional private law tort suits only vaguely, if at all.
Their aim is not to carve out a realm for private autonomy, but to enlist
the government in implementing public values embodied in regulatory
statutes or constitutional provisions. Most important, both the courts and
the regulations tend not to take existing private preferences and social
norms for granted, but treat them as subject to public scrutiny and re-
view.'0 The rejection of the autonomy of private preferences-the hall-
mark of a public rather than private tort law-has a number of conse-
quences for the general problem of judicial remedies for official wrongs.
1. The Inadequacy of a Rights-Based Approach to Regulatory Problems
One consequence of rejecting the autonomy of private preferences is
that an entitlement-based conception of law becomes ill-suited to many,
perhaps most regulatory programs.4' As Professor Jaffe emphasized long
ago,' 2 regulatory programs are frequently couched in terms of relevant
factors rather than of rights and duties. A person may have an interest
that an administrator must consider; it is rare, however, for a regulatory
scheme to grant an entitlement of the common law form to a particular
person or group of persons.
Moreover, regulatory programs frequently involve benefits that are col-
lective in character. The right to clean air is an example. In light of dif-
fering individual preferences for benefits that are inescapably joint, it is
difficult to speak the language of private rights. Finally, regulatory poli-
cies must often shift with rapidly changing economic conditions. In such
circumstances, statutory benefits are not easily understood as static
entitlements.
2. The Open-Ended Character of Public Law Norms
The private law of tort is built on reasonably determinate standards of
conduct. By contrast, public law torts frequently involve standards that
40. The recent fascination of American law professors with the work of Habermas and his prede-
cessors in the Frankfurt School stems from a common interest in this problem. For general discussion,
see R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 65-70
(1981); D. HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS 332-39
(1980).
41. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1271-75.
42. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 508 (1965).
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are abstract and open-ended.43 In constitutional litigation and in many
cases involving regulatory provisions, it is often hard to speak in terms of
the rule of law at all. The courts' role is not to apply rules laid down in
advance, but to give content to public norms."
3. The Need to Promote Participation
Under private tort law, litigation is treated as bipolar, and third-party
effects are discounted or ignored. As a result, the problem of participation
is usually ignored.45 By contrast, in public tort law-especially in cases
involving the structural injunction-participation often operates as a kind
of surrogate for the rule of law. The decree will necessarily affect large
numbers of persons. Because their interests may conflict, it is important to
ensure that they are represented as the decision is framed.46 In short, as
governing norms become increasingly open-ended, decisions are disci-
plined (or so it is hoped) by allowing those affected to receive a hearing.
4. The Preference for Injunctive Relief
Damages remedies, the traditional form of relief in private law, are
most appropriate when it is desirable to base decisions on the traditional
economic criterion of "willingness to pay." In regulatory programs, how-
ever, this criterion becomes much less coherent. Such programs often
amount to a deliberate rejection of the willingness-to-pay criterion as a
basis for social choice. They do not take the existing distribution of in-
come and the existing set of entitlements for granted, but subject them to
public scrutiny and review. Indeed, such programs sometimes depend on
the notion that it is irrelevant whether the purported beneficiaries would
choose the right at issue or how much they would be willing to pay for it.
A person's right to freedom from desegregation or from unlawful treat-
ment in a mental institution is not to be measured by seeing how much
that person is willing to pay for the benefit. In such circumstances, it is
hardly surprising that courts have rejected the traditional preference for
damages relief.
43. The nature and extent of the differences between common law courts deciding damage actions
under standards of reasonableness and regulatory agencies and courts filling in open-ended regulatory
provisions is a difficult subject that I cannot discuss here.
44. It is of course unclear to what extent it was ever plausible to attempt to understand adjudica-
tion in terms of rule-application. See Kennedy, supra note 8.
45. See Chayes, supra note 3; Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 976 (1982).
46. This premise is central to political pluralism. See T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 52-84 (1975); J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DE.
MOCRACY 15-18, 237-40 (1980).
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5. The Advantages of Continuing Supervision
Finally, structural decrees may be favored precisely because of what is
regarded as a cost under an entitlement approach: The parties and the
courts will continuously monitor and control the conduct of the govern-
mental defendant by means of the structural injunction. The aim, in short,
is to ensure that decisions are subject to public scrutiny and review. It is
in this sense that the structural injunction can act as a surrogate for legis-
lative control.
III.
These factors point to the need for a new conception of the remedial
process-for an evaluation of the underlying premises of structural reme-
dies and for a comparison of these premises with those of private tort law.
It should come as no surprise if such a comparison tends to show that
private tort law depends on a distinctive if familiar conception of the func-
tion of law-one that sees governmental activity as primarily facilitative,
that treats preferences as private and exogenous, and that regards judicial
supervision as at best a necessary evil. The competing conception tends to
treat judicial supervision not as a cost, but as an indispensable element in
self-government. Whether this conception will ultimately prove coherent
or workable is a large and difficult question. In the end, however, an
approach that attempts to derive public law remedies from the private law
model may miss an important point and thus provide an incomplete per-
spective on the problems raised by suits against the government.

